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Theories as Recipes: Third-Order Virtue and Vice 
Michaela M. McSweeney 
 
Abstract: A basic way of evaluating metaphysical theories is to ask whether they give satisfying 
(not necessarily truthful!) answers to the questions they set out to resolve. I propose an account 
of “third-order” virtue that tells us what it takes for certain kinds of metaphysical theories to do 
so. We should think of these theories as recipes. I identify three good-making features of recipes 
and show that they translate to third-order theoretical virtues. I apply the view to two theories—
mereological universalism and plenitudinous platonism—and draw out their third-order virtues 
and vices. One lesson is that there is an important difference between essentially and non-
essentially third-order vicious theories. I also argue that if a theory is essentially third-order 
vicious, it cannot be assessed for more standard “second-order” theoretical virtues and vices, like 
parsimony. This motivates the idea that third-order virtues are distinct from second-order ones. 
Finally, I suggest that the relationship between truth, progress, and third-order virtue is more 
complex than it seems. 
 
 
Metaphysicians often focus on what I’ll call first-order desiderata: that our theories accurately 
describe the data (if there is any data); that they don’t logically entail contradictions or wildly 
implausible consequences, etc. (and perhaps, that they ‘seem plausible’). We also often focus on the 
second-order desiderata: that our theories have certain virtues (e.g. explanatory power, unification, 
parsimony, etc.) and lack certain vices. When doing metametaphysics, we often focus on epistemic 
and methodological questions: whether our theories are on epistemically shaky ground; whether we 
could be justified in believing any of them; whether we can assimilate metaphysics to science; and so 
on.1  
 
In this paper, I focus on a different metametaphysical question: what properties should a theory 
have in order for us to be able to assess it for these first and second order desiderata? I’ll call those 
properties third-order desiderata. One way of thinking about the “third order” is this: what properties 
do we want a set of claims to have in order for them to even count as a metaphysical theory? I 
dislike this way of framing the question, which I think is prone to leading to merely verbal disputes 
about what counts as a theory—and there is a substantive issue here.2 Instead, I propose that we 
think of there being third-order virtues and vices, just like the second-order ones (the more standard 
theoretical virtues).  
 
Our central third-order desideratum that we want metaphysical theories to fully answer the 
question(s) that they set out to answer. Indeed, the best way to understand what third-order virtues 
are is to focus on what makes a metaphysical theory a successful (not necessarily true!) answer to its 
corresponding question. Third-order virtues will vary with what kind of question this is. Some 
                                                        
1 Thanks for helpful comments and discussion to Mark Balaguer, Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, Joshua Eisenthal, Maegan 
Fairchild, Colin Marshall, Colin McLear, Daniel Méndez, Ned Markosian, Sally Sedgwick, Mallory Webber, Alastair 
Wilson, to audience members at the 2019 Pacific APA meeting in Vancouver, and especially to Rachael Molenaar, to the 
insightful participants in my 2019 ‘Third Realm’ graduate seminar at Boston University, and to Kerry McKenzie for 
believing in (an early stage of, at least!) this project. 
 
2 I find it problematic to think about theories in an ‘all-or-nothing’ way—which is why I frame things here as about 
virtue and vice. Policing the boundaries of theoryhood so that certain theories get ruled out doesn’t help us make 
progress.  
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metaphysical theories aim to analyze a certain concept we already have (e.g. free will). Some 
metaphysical theories aim to give ameliorative accounts of (e.g.) social phenomena (e.g. gender). 
These two kinds of projects have different aims and correspondingly different third-order virtues 
and vices.  
 
My interest is in what I’ll call ontological theories, which answer questions like: ‘which things are there 
(in a particular domain) and what are they like/how are they arranged/how do they interact?’. My 
goal is to spell out what it takes for an ontological theory to successfully answer its question(s).   
 
I resist the idea that we should think about metaphysical theories in just the same way that we think 
about scientific theories, or that we should assimilate metaphysics to science. Contemporary 
metaphysicians and scientists often care about distinct questions; and ontological theories in 
particular seem to have a different kind of flavor, as well as a different form, than our current best 
(e.g.) physical theories. However, my approach is partly influenced by the philosophy of science, and 
I mention some connections later. 
 
My central claim is that we should think of ontological theories as recipes, and third-order virtues as 
corresponding to three virtues of recipes: they specify their ingredients; they give us instructions 
about how to turn those ingredients into a final product; and they explain their ontology and 
terminology in terms of concepts that we understand.  
 
I suspect that proponents of theories that aren’t (by my lights) third-order virtuous will simply reject 
my claims about what it takes for a theory to be third-order virtuous. I’m unconcerned by this, since 
my goal is to lay out a framework for third-order virtue--not to convince anyone that their first-
order views are false. However, I will also argue that one of the theories I examine, plenitudinous 
platonism, is essentially third-order vicious, and that it follows that it cannot be assessed for second-
order virtue—so there is a bullet such philosophers must bite. 
 
In §1, I introduce the central claim of the paper: we should think of ontological theories as recipes, 
and correspondingly should think of third-order virtuousness of ontological theories as akin to what 
makes a good recipe. In §2, I introduce the two metaphysical theories I will discuss, plenitudinous 
platonism and mereological universalism. In §3, I examine whether mereological universalism is 
third-order virtuous. In §4, I examine whether plenitudinous platonism is third-order virtuous. In §5, 
I use plenitudinous platonism to argue that if a theory is essentially third-order vicious, it is not apt 
for assessment for second-order virtue or vice. In §6, I conclude by briefly discussing Kant, 
Einstein, and whether third-order vicious theories are good for anything.  
 
1. Ontological Theories as Recipes 
 
I believe that we should think of ontological theories, at least roughly speaking, as recipes. Think 
about a recipe for bread. The recipe will tell you (a) what ingredients you need and exactly how 
much of them you need; (b) how to incorporate and cook them properly; and (c) how to understand 
its equipment and terminology (for example, at least in a recipe for beginner bread bakers, it might 
explain what it means to ‘let the dough rise’ or ‘knead’, or whether to use an electric mixer). 
 
These translate into our three criteria as follows:  
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(a) A theory should specify its base ingredients: e.g.: what it takes to be primitive; what it takes 
to be fundamental; what it’s ur-elements are; etc. Call a theory that does so foundational, and a 
theory that fails to do so baseless.  
(b) A theory should give guiding instructions: it should specify how those ingredients need to be 
incorporated together in order to generate the theory’s full ontology and tell us what 
relations hold between the items in its ontology. Call a theory that does so guiding, and a 
theory that fails to do so guideless.  
(c) A theory should specify any scaffolding (outside machinery, e.g.: interpretation, bridge 
principles, mathematics, etc.) that needs to be wheeled in in order for the theory to answer 
its question(s). (One way to think of this: if it is maximally scaffolded, a theory will “explain 
itself” in terms that you can understand, just as a maximally scaffolded recipe will explain its 
steps, ingredients, etc. in terms that you can understand.) Call a theory that does soscaffolded 
and a theory that fails to do so unscaffolded.  
 
The recipe analogy also makes sense of our initial desideratum (that a theory fully answers the 
question(s) it sets out to answer): a recipe for buttery lemon cake should produce that, rather than 
dry brownies.  
 
There are three important notes here. First, ontological theories don’t always need to be a recipe for 
everything, and thus, needn’t be complete—what is important is that they successfully answer the 
specific ontological question that they are invoked to answer. Sufficiently general questions (‘what is 
there and what is it like?’) do require complete theories. But most of our ontological questions aren’t 
like that, and so the theories that answer them will be incomplete.  
 
Second, there is one thing about the recipe analogy that may be misleading. Cooking is a process 
that unfolds over time, and one which (skepticism aside) produces a new thing from some initial 
things. This might suggest that ontological theories must involve processes, grounding, causation, 
building, production, etc.; which might in turn suggest that our ontology cannot be flat--that some 
things must be more fundamental than others, or cause others, or ground others.  
 
To see this is not so, consider flat universalism, which says: (a) mereological universalism is true; (b) 
there are simples; (c) all of the axioms are as normally stated but (d) there is no sense of production 
or building in composition, and simples are not more fundamental than composites.  
 
The recipe analogy can accommodate the flat universalist. Ontological theories are, in part, ways for 
us to understand reality. They deliver (candidate) objective facts, but they also deliver ways for us to 
understand and represent those facts. According to flat universalism, composite objects are not less 
fundamental than simples. The flat universalist should think of the “ingredients” of her theory as 
primitives, not fundamental entities. These are the simples. She should think of the “instructions” as 
instructions to us—the thinkers--about the circumstances in which the simples compose. The 
asymmetry of the ingredients (the simples) and the finished product (the composites) is not 
(necessarily) a worldly asymmetry, it’s an epistemic or representational asymmetry. Our instructions 
can contain information about how the objects are related to each other, without entailing that those 
relations are layering relations (that relate more fundamental things to less fundamental things). For 
a theory to be guiding is not (necessarily) for the final product to be less fundamental than the 
ingredients. (a)-(c) are to be read as neutral with respect to whether there is worldly asymmetry.  
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Third, you might wonder why scaffolding should be a part of a metaphysical theory, rather than an 
external way to help us understand the theory. But what I’m interested in is metaphysical views about 
reality. And we need those to be intelligible in order to understand them. One way in which we want 
more out of metaphysical theories than we do out of scientific theories might be a matter of levels, 
or of how fine-grained the theory is; in some ways we can think of this as a question of how 
interpreted the theory is (the more interpreted, the more likely it is to successfully answer the kinds 
of ontological questions some metaphysicians are interested in). E.g.: we can’t start doing the 
metaphysics of quantum mechanics until we distinguish between interpretations of quantum 
mechanics; and the interpretations themselves involve scaffolding. Perhaps more controversially, I 
believe that metaphysical theories are much better answers to ontological questions when we can 
understand them in some fairly deep sense—when they give us a way to conceptualize their content. 
 
I’ll examine two metaphysical theories that fail to deliver on some of (a)-(c): mereological universalism 
(roughly, the view that any two objects compose an additional object) and plenitudinous platonism 
(roughly, the view that any abstracta that could exist, do exist). I’ll argue that (a) depending on what 
question(s) we are using it to answer, mereological universalism may or may not be third-order 
virtuous—it is neither essentially third-order virtuous nor vicious, and that (b) plenitudinous 
platonism is essentially third-order virtuous given its standard motivations and the question(s) we 
want it to answer. But the central point here is not to pick on either mereological universalism or 
plenitudinous platonism, but instead to examine them in order to motivate the claim that (a)-(c) are 
what we want out of ontological theories, as well as to show that these third-order desiderata affect 
assessments of second-order theoretical virtues and vices when it comes to metaphysical theories. 
My conclusions have implications for other theories, and not just in the abstract. For example, 
Lewis’ (1986) modal realism is also a plenitudinous theory, and is motivated (but only in part!) by 
somewhat similar metaphysical and epistemic worries as those the plenitudinous platonist is 
responding to.3  
 
2. Plenitudinous Platonism and Mereological Universalism as Answers to Questions 
 
Focus on the natural numbers, and something we know about them, e.g. that 2 + 7 = 9. How do we 
know this? How can we know things about abstracta, given that we are located in space-time, they 
are not, and we are causally disconnected from them? Plenitudinous Platonism (hereafter ‘PLP’) was 
proposed, and is attractive, in part because it seems to provide the platonist with an easy answer to 
these epistemic worries.4 I focus in the remainder of the paper on Balaguer’s (1995, 1998) version of 
PLP.5 According to PLP, every mathematical structure that could exist (in the sense that it is internally 
consistent) does exist. So long as the natural number structure that contains 2, 7, and 9 is internally 
consistent, PLP guarantees that our belief that 2 + 7 = 9 is justified and true. We know that 2 + 7 = 
                                                        
3 There is a related literature about Lewis’ views that, if I had more space, I would delve into: Divers and Melia (2002, 
2003, 2006), Bremer (2003), Paseau (2006), Cameron (2012), Wilson (ms).  
4 For defenses of Plenitudinous Platonism, see eg. Balaguer (1995), (1998); Linsky and Zalta (1995), and possibly Hale 
(2013, ch. 9). Beall (1999) defends a view on which not just consistent, but also inconsistent mathematical objects exist. 
More recent applications and discussions of this kind of view or something in its ballpark can be seen in set theory 
(Hamkins 2011) and in responses to similar challenges in metaethics in Eklund (2017) Clarke-Doane (2017) and Balaguer 
(forthcoming), and the metaphysics of color (see Kalderon (2007) and Mizrahi (2006)). The epistemic “reliability” 
challenge is due to Benacerraf (1973) and Field (1989).  
5 My sense is that all versions will fail to be third-order virtuous, but the details make a difference. E.g.: Linsky and 
Zalta’s (1995) view is arguably guiding in a way that Balaguer’s is not, but still, I suspect, baseless and not sufficiently 
scaffolded. But that argument is for another day. 
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9 not by causal contact or magical powers of intuition, but because the abstract world contains 
everything that it possibly could: everything such that its existence doesn’t entail a contradiction. For 
example, the proponent of PLP must believe in a structure that is just like the natural numbers 
(‘NN’), but is missing the number 9. Call this structure NN*. The ‘numbers’ in NN* can’t be 
identical to their counterparts in NN—so 8* is not 8—because if they were, we would have an 
immediate contradiction (8+1 = 9 and 8+1 = undefined). But if 8 and 8* are distinct, then there is 
nothing internally contradictory about NN*.  
 
PLP is intended to answer at least two distinct questions. In addition to answering the epistemic 
challenge, it answers the ontological question: what abstract objects are there?  
 
I will argue that PLP fails to adequately answer both its questions, because it is baseless, guideless, 
and only partly scaffolded. First, I will compare it to another theory, mereological universalism (hereafter 
‘MU’), which says, very roughly, that any two objects compose a numerically distinct object.6 (So: 
when does composition occur? Always.) PLP and MU look superficially similar: they both entail that 
there are a lot more things than we might have thought there were. Further, both PLP and MU are 
often motivated by epistemic problems. MU, or some variation of it, is sometimes invoked to 
answer the epistemic arbitrariness charges that come with attempting to justify our belief in ordinary 
composite objects like tables and trees.  
 
However, there are two crucial differences. First, MU is sometimes invoked to answer a non-
ontological question that has a different metaphysical flavor than that of the question PLP is 
responding to. Insofar as MU successfully answers this question, MU might be a perfectly good 
metaphysical theory without meeting conditions (a)-(c). Second, PLP is essentially third-order 
vicious, whereas MU can be adapted to be virtuous. I’ll examine each in turn. 
 
3. Is Mereological Universalism Third-Order Virtuous? It Depends.  
 
There are (at least) two distinct metaphysical questions that MU is invoked to answer. The first is 
‘under what circumstances do objects compose other objects?’. This is a ‘how does it work and what 
is it like?’ question, not an ontological question. I’ll call it the mechanism question, because it asks 
about the nature of a mechanism or relation. The second is the ontological question: ‘what 
composite concrete objects are there?’.  
 
There are also multiple ways of understanding what MU says. At its most basic, it provides us with 
nothing but a set of formal axioms. These axioms already count as guiding, because they gives us 
instructions for producing one collection of things from another. That is, we “feed in” some ur-
elements, and then the axioms “produce” new elements. This set of uninterpreted axioms comes 
close to answering the mechanism question, but does not succeed because it is unscaffolded.  
 
Scaffolding is what allows us to understand a theory as being about what we take it to be about—in 
some sense, it is what allows us to interpret the theory. One role that scaffolding plays is to help 
interpret formal axioms, if formal axioms are what make our theory guiding.7 But to answer the 
mechanism question, our scaffolding needs to connect the axioms to the actual conceptual content 
we are talking about (in this case, composite physical objects). The axioms, supplemented with 
                                                        
6 I’m using the non-reflexive notion of parthood.  
7 I don’t pretend that this isn’t very messy; witness the ink that has been spilled about interpretation.  
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something as basic as a claim that these axioms are about composition, and their ur-elements are 
whatever the (concrete) simple objects are (if there are any), are enough to answer the mechanism question.8 
Call the axioms plus this minimal scaffolding barebones MU. 
 
Barebones MU is baseless—it doesn’t tell us anything about the simples. When barebones MU is 
invoked to answer the mechanism question, it doesn’t matter whether there are any objects, or 
whether there is only a single simple (and hence, no composite objects). It makes no difference how 
many different kinds of simples there are, or what they are like. The mechanism question is about 
the circumstances under which composition occurs and not about what objects there actually are. As 
a mechanistic theory, MU doesn’t need to tell us about its ingredients. It only needs to tell us about 
its instructions and its scaffolding. So, insofar as barebones MU is invoked to answer the mechanism 
question, its baselessness is not a third-order vice.  
 
There is a lurking lesson here. Sometimes, when metaphysical theories are invoked to answer 
modally broad questions, it may often be that it is better for them to be baseless than foundational, 
so as to be modally flexible. The mechanism question is modally broad because it is not a question 
that is only about the actual world. (This is not to say that if barebones MU is true, it is necessarily 
true.) Barebones MU is not solely tied to actuality, because it allows for variability in what its base 
might be. This is what we want if it is to be a successful answer to the question ‘how does this 
composition relation work?, since the relation works in the same way in non-actual worlds. PLP 
doesn’t involve any particular relation or mechanism, and so it is hard to imagine what its 
mechanistic question could be. Further, PLP can’t have different primitives at different worlds, 
because anything that it posits in a different world, it must also posit in our world. 
 
Barebones MU sufficiently answers the relevant mechanism question. And barebones MU is baseless, 
guiding, and minimally scaffolded. The upshot is that what it takes for a mechanistic theory to be third-
order virtuous is quite different from what it takes for an ontological theory to be third-order 
virtuous.  
 
However, MU is often invoked to answer ontological questions—e.g. ‘is there a table here?’, and 
more generally, to answer the question: “what composite objects are there?”. Barebones MU cannot 
successfully answer these questions. A good answer requires more scaffolding and a foundation. 
 
Suppose that we want a metaphysical theory that accounts for the data that we have from ordinary 
perception; stipulate that we in fact perceive tables, mountains, and fingers, and we want our theory 
to account for their existence. Barebones MU cannot do so. MU would need to be foundational in 
order to explain what it was we were starting with that “built” the objects we were familiar with. 
And it would need more scaffolding to explain why applying the axioms to our simples would in fact 
generate tables, mountains, and fingers. (E.g., one thing we would need to explain is that tables are 
composite objects. Otherwise, we just have a theory about when simples compose composites, but 
no bridge principle or bit of theory that tells us why we should believe in tables.) So unless MU is 
supplemented with these things—(at least) an account of what the simples are, and also bridge 
principles such as the claim that tables just are the composite object made up of the simples in the 
                                                        
8 While barebones MU is guiding because of its formal axioms, we don’t need formalism to meet desiderata (b). Most 
metaphysical theories are written in (mostly) plain natural language. There is nothing superior about having a formal 
theory. Indeed, if a theory is guiding because of formal axioms, the theory will require more scaffolding (in explaining 
how to interpret the formalism).  
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spacetime region in which they seem to be located—MU is not successfully answering its ontological 
question. MU, in answer to the ontological question, must be foundational and (much more fully) 
scaffolded than barebones MU is.  
 
A rough sketch of a common argument about composition looks like this:  
 
1) It’s objectionably arbitrary (either for epistemic reasons, or ontological for avoiding 
anthropocentricism reasons, etc.) to claim that there is a table here but no shmable here 
(where a shmable is composed of ¾ of the parts of the table and my coffee cup).  
2) So, we should avoid arbitrariness by either (i) rejecting that there are any composite 
objects or (ii) accepting that any two objects compose another one.  
-(ii) is just MU, and has advantages over (i). (We needn’t get into the details about what those 
are.) So we should accept MU.9  
 
If this kind of argument structure is supposed to give us a reason to believe MU, then MU better 
actually secure the result that the table in front of me exists. And if our question is: given that we believe 
in tables, must we believe in shmables?, then the metaphysical theory we appeal to in the course of 
answering this epistemic question (negatively) must tell us that tables exist. Barebones MU doesn’t 
tell us anything about tables. We need a theory that tells us something about what our primitives are 
(is foundational), and that tells us that tables and shmables are among its composites (it needs more 
scaffolding—at the least, bridge principles that tell us that tables just are composite concrete 
objects).  
 
Barebones MU is only a good answer to the mechanism question. But there is nothing about 
barebones MU that precludes us from adding to it: specifying primitives and scaffolding those 
primitives; adding more scaffolding in the form of “bridge principles” that tell us that, e.g., tables 
just are composite material objects made up of mutrons, and so on. Whether the resulting theory is 
plausible, true, or worth taking seriously is one question, but it is not the question at stake here—our 
question is whether such a theory would count as third-order virtuous. 
 
MU is consistent with many  different views about (e.g.) what the simples are, what they are like, 
how homogenous they are, and so on; and nothing about the motivation for MU requires us to posit 
many different kinds of simples. E.g. here is a third-order virtuous “fleshed out” version of MU, call 
it MUtron: Everything is made out of simple particles that are all the same type, the mutron. Mutrons 
all have the same set of essential properties specified by the theory (e.g.: size, shape, charge, color, 
etc.). Everything concrete is composed out of mutrons. Any two objects compose a numerically 
distinct object. We should believe in Tillie the table because Tillie’s smallest parts are mutrons; the 
axioms of MU are true; tables are nothing more than composite concrete objects; so Tillie must 
exist. And so on. Whether you think that MUtron is plausible is not relevant here. The important 
point is that it is (a) third-order virtuous and (b) consistent with the way MU answers its 
metaphysical and epistemic questions, and consistent with the core commitments of MU. 
 
                                                        
9 E.g. (though not all of these are endorsements!), Beebee (2015), Hawthorne (2006, introduction), Korman (2010, 
2015), Noonan (2014), Quine (1981: 13), Sidelle (2002), Sider (2001), Van Cleve (1986, 2008), Also see Fairchild (ms) for 
worries about (a) clarifying arbitrariness arguments and (b) whether arbitrariness arguments can actually motivate views 
like MU. 
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So we can adapt barebones MU to be a third-order virtuous ontological theory. In contrast, some 
theories, like PLP, are essentially baseless, guideless, or unscaffolded: we cannot add a foundation, or 
a set of instructions, or more scaffolding, without making the theory fail in some other way.  
 
4. Is Plenitudinous Platonism Third-Order Virtuous? No, and Essentially Not! 
 
PLP’s ontological question is this: what abstract objects are there? PLP fails to answer this question, and 
so is third-order vicious. It is baseless and guideless, but perhaps partly scaffolded. Further, it is 
essential to PLP that it fails to answer its ontological question—which distinguishes it from 
barebones MU, which can be supplemented to fully answer MU’s ontological question.10 
 
PLP gives us instructions, but they are not instructions that give us a way to determine an ontology. 
Instead, they—at best—allow us to determine what is not in our ontology. Instead of telling us what 
is in the domain of abstracta, PLP’s instructions tell us how to determine what is not in the domain 
of abstracta: if a potential structure or object is internally inconsistent, then it is not an abstract 
object; everything else (non-concrete) is. We can make some progress: for example, there is an 
abstract object for every concept we have, so we can consult our concepts and try to come up with 
new ones. But we are still missing out on huge swaths of abstracta. We might also point out that 
there is an abstract object for every concept we could possibly have, and fish around for new 
concepts.  But even this is not enough: PLP is committed to alien objects (objects that we lack 
concepts corresponding to, or even ways to construct such concepts).11  
 
If PLP is committed to alien objects (in the specific sense in which we have neither concepts that 
correspond to these objects nor procedures for arriving at those concepts), then it is analytically 
guideless. When a theory is committed to alien objects, then it simply follows that the theory cannot 
provide us with a set of instructions for arriving at our ontology, since an alien object (in the narrow 
sense I laid out above) is one which no procedure could allow us to arrive at a concept of. And PLP 
must be committed to alien objects if it is going to sufficiently answer its epistemic question. 
Lurking in the background of PLP’s epistemic question is this: why would it be that our beliefs (or 
discoveries) about mathematics map onto the actual mathematical facts about the actual 
mathematical structures? This seems like a magical coincidence given that we don’t seem connected 
to those facts in the right sorts of ways. PLP answers: it is not magical if any consistent arbitrary belief, 
maps onto actual mathematical facts about actual mathematical structures. This includes beliefs 
which humans could not possibly have (but which, e.g., either omniscient creatures like gods could 
have, or creatures who were sufficiently differently cognitively and mentally constituted than 
humans could have). If so, then by definition, PLP cannot provide us with a set of instructions for 
determining its ontology. So if PLP successfully answers its epistemic question, it will turn out to be 
analytic of, and hence essential to, PLP that it is guideless.  
 
It is instructive to examine a tamer version of PLP, which restricts itself to positing an object for 
each of our possible concepts, rather than also positing objects we could not possibly dream of. This 
version of PLP, call it PLP-, must still posit NN* (the structure that is a qualitative duplicate of the 
natural number structure, except that it is missing a number*, 9*).  
                                                        
10 Some of the argument in this and §5 is somewhat similar to Restall’s (2003) argument that PLP is ill-formed, and, if 
sharpened, is either too strong or too weak. However, I am concerned about a much more general issue than Restall is. 
11 Not all versions of PLP are committed to this; e.g., if Hale (2013) counts as a proponent, he seems to be defending a 
tamer version.  
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Let us first restrict our attention to these NN-like structures: structures that are something like 
qualitative duplicates of NN, but with some numbers added or removed. We might be able to 
construct a set of instructions that would deliver all of the NN-like structures.   
 
However, once we contemplate what PLP- has to say about the rest of mathematical space, it seems 
impossible that there could be any such instructions except for the one-liner “any internally 
consistent mathematical structure actually exists”. If I had to catalogue what there was in the 
abstract world, I couldn’t just say “mathematical objects work this way:” and then list a set of 
instructions for “constructing” mathematical objects. Instead, each mathematical structure is 
constructed in a different way. So, it looks like the proponent of PLP- would have to give a distinct 
principle for each type of mathematical structure. Given that there are infinite variations on NN that 
she must accept, and this is just scratching the surface of the entities she must accept, it follows that 
there is no finite way to state a set of instructions for constructing the ontology of even the limited 
PLP-. (And note that, given the seeming open-endedness to human creativity, it is unlikely that there 
is a countably infinite way to do it.)   
 
Further, insofar as PLP is supposed to be a response to the epistemic question, there is no 
principled way to separate mathematical from non-mathematical abstract objects; every possible 
abstract object could be, for all we know, an alien mathematical object. So there may be some 
mathematical structure which has as components various musical works. (Note: the proponent of 
PLP must be committed to this for the same epistemic reasons that motivate her view as a response to 
the reliability challenge, not in the same way that (e.g.) certain kinds of mathematical structuralists 
must be committed to the idea that anything could serve as a node in a mathematical structure.) And 
it is easy to see that we could not possibly come up with a guiding version of even PLP-.  
 
It looks very difficult to see how PLP- could possibly have instructions (at least, instructions that 
themselves were finitely long). And it is analytically impossible to produce instructions for PLP. I 
conclude that PLP is guideless, and moreover that it is essentially guideless, insofar as it can answer its 
epistemic question in the way it is intended to. 
 
By similar (but simpler) reasoning we should conclude that PLP requires infinitely many primitive 
terms, and that it hence is baseless. We would need infinitely many 0, 0*, 0**…s and infinitely many 
successor functions just to generate the relevant NN, NN*, NN**, etc., and again, that these are an 
extremely small part of just mathematical abstract space for the proponent of PLP (not to mention 
non-mathematical abstract space!). PLP would also require alien primitives. And even PLP-‘s 
primitives seem unlikely to be countably infinite. So it seems that PLP—even in its restricted 
form—is likely essentially baseless.12 
                                                        
12 Readers may start wondering about the relationship between primitive terms and fundamental entities: maybe there is 
some theory of mathematics that can ground or secure all of the non-fundamental facts/entities that the proponent of 
PLP believes in (though I’m pessimistic). If so, perhaps the only primitives we need are those in the fundamental theory. 
But first, given the epistemic challenge that PLP is supposed to be answering, I don’t see how any proponent of PLP 
could possibly endorse this kind of claim, given the epistemic leaps that are required to commit to it. Second, if a theory 
only provides us with fundamental terms, and then instructions, then in order to be third-order virtuous, it is going to 
have to end up with a lot of scaffolding. Given my framework, the grounding theorist must accept that claims about 
“what grounds what” just are scaffolding, and hence that they show up in the theory; but much more needs to be said 
about what this means for evaluating theories for second-order virtue, as well as for the question of whether grounding 
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Why require finite, or countably infinite, bases or guides? If ontological theories are like recipes, we 
need to be able to follow them: they need to do epistemic work for us. And we can’t follow them if 
they have uncountably many ingredients or steps. 
 
Let me briefly say something more direct about why we need foundational, guiding ontological 
theories. Stepping away from PLP for a moment, suppose we are focused on the question: “what 
abstract objects are there?” (and perhaps: “what are they like?”). And now consider some standard 
ways of trying to characterize abstracta. It is often claimed that abstracta either (i) lack location in 
spacetime or (ii) are causally inert.13 Either claim tells us something about what differentiates 
abstracta from concreta. But no one would treat either (i), (ii), or their conjunction as an informative 
theory of abstracta, one which, for example, we can start assessing for second-order virtues like 
explanatory power or parsimony. ((i) and (ii) might be informative theories that are responses to the 
question “what differentiates abstracta and concreta?”, but that isn’t an ontological question in the 
sense under discussion here. Neither (i) nor (ii) tells us anything about the natures of abstracta or 
about any properties they have (besides the negative, non-intrinsic, properties of lacking location 
and lacking causal powers). Nor do they tell us what abstract objects there are. (Note: both (i) and 
(ii) are also, I think, bad answers to the question “what is an abstract object?”, which might be closer 
to what they are actually intended to answer; this is because neither tells us anything at all about 
what abstract objects are like; they just tell us about what they aren’t like. They don’t tell us anything 
about properties that give us a sense of the character of abstracta. See my (ms) for discussion.)   
 
Consider a physical theory that says “there are some new fundamental particles; they aren’t like 
anything that you’re familiar with; and moreover, I can’t tell you anything about what they are like or 
how they give rise to the manifest image; but I’m positing them because they can do such-and-such 
work for me, and make it more likely that my theory is true”. Such a description of fundamental 
reality would not pass muster as a fully fleshed-out scientific theory that was apt for being assessed 
for theoretical virtuousness. Nor should (i) or (ii) pass muster as a fully fleshed-out metaphysical 
theory of abstracta, apt for assessment for (e.g.) parsimoniousness. What PLP shares with (i) and (ii) 
is that both can be thought of as constraining theories: they tell us only about the constraints on what 
can be let in to the ontology; they don’t give us a recipe for constructing a positive ontology. I’ll say 
more about this in §6. 
 
Is PLP scaffolded? This is a much trickier question to answer. But it will help us get clear on 
different ways in which theories can be scaffolded. PLP is clearly at least partly scaffolded. This is 
because it (at least partly) answers the question of (e.g.) which of the things in platonic heaven we 
are referring to when we talk about whether 2+7 = 9. I won’t get into the details here, but if 
securing reference is a part of scaffolding, PLP is (perhaps unsatisfyingly!) scaffolded. 
 
There is also an important sense in which PLP is not scaffolded, which is instructive to examine. All 
theories, it seems, must involve some undefined primitives. And sometimes, those undefined 
primitives just are the theory’s “base ingredients”. But sometimes, undefined primitives can still be 
scaffolded (and sometimes, even informally defined). Consider MU: if MU is going to answer its 
                                                        
claims are themselves grounded in the fundamental. A proponent of my framework and grounding might use Dasgupta’s 
(2014) strategy (note, though, his use of ‘scaffolding’ is distinct from mine—though related). 
13 See, e.g., Lewis (1986).  
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mechanistic question, we need to know that its primitives pick out whatever the compositionally simple 
concrete entities are. 
  
When taken as an answer to the mechanism question, all we need to know that is that the primitives 
of MU are whatever ends up filling the theoretical role of the “simples”. For MU to be an 
ontological theory, we must know something more about these primitives. For MU to license belief 
in tables, it must entail that this table right here has parts that are, in fact, simples. This suggests that 
for theories to answer ontological questions, we need scaffolding for our primitives, not just (e.g.) 
bridge principles about tables or stipulations about the subject matter of our theories. This primitive 
scaffolding serves to connect the primitives in our theories to something we better understand (e.g. 
that the smallest parts of this table are simples connects the simples to something we already 
conceptually grasp).   
 
But PLP’s primitives cannot be scaffolded, because PLP is baseless. It doesn’t have as many 
primitives as it would need for to generate its entire ontology. We can in fact list some of the 
primitives of PLP, e.g., 0, the successor function, 0*, the successor function*, etc.. And some of 
these primitives will be at least partly scaffolded. But even supposing list all of the primitives in PLP, 
most of them would be unscaffolded—they would be entirely disconnected to anything that we 
already had a grip on, and so we could get no understanding of them at all, except via examining the 
structures that their respective instructions would “create”—but those are also unscaffolded! And 
so, just as PLP seems to be essentially baseless and guideless, it seems to be essentially unscaffolded: 
even if we could specify all of its primitives, we wouldn’t be able to sufficiently scaffold them.  
 
PLP is essentially baseless, guideless, and at least partly unscaffolded. So there is no way to turn PLP 
into a theory that is foundational, guiding, and sufficiently scaffolded to be third-order virtuous.  
 
5. Third-Order Vice Leads to Second-Order Unassessability 
 
I now want to argue that PLP’s third-order vices make it inapt for assessment for second-order 
virtues (e.g. explanatory value, unification, parsimony, etc.). This should concern those who might 
respond to what’s been said so far by rejecting my third-order criteria. While we might disagree 
about exactly how to cash out second-order virtue and vice, assessing theories for second-order 
virtue is one of our main methods for theory choice in metaphysics. If theories that are third-order 
vicious can’t be assessed for second-order virtue, then we cannot compare them, at the second-order 
level, to third-order virtuous theories.  
 
I will solely focus on parsimony, and will show that PLP cannot be properly assessed for either 
ontological or ideological parsimony. I think similar arguments can be made for other second-order 
virtues, but more needs to be done to extend what I say here to other potential second-order virtues.  
 
It is somewhat standard to think that it is qualitative and not quantitative ontological parsimony that is 
virtuous: that is, a theory is less parsimonious insofar as it posits more kinds of entities, not insofar 
as it posits more entities.14 But I will briefly say something about why PLP can’t be assessed for 
quantitative parsimony. We cannot meaningfully compare PLP to any other platonic mathematical 
                                                        
14 The claim that it is generally accepted that it is qualitative parsimony that matters often appears in general discussions 
of parsimony, e.g. Baker (2016, §2). Lewis (1986) appeals to it to defend against the charge of a bloated ontology. 
However, there are dissenters, e.g. Nolan (1997), Baker (2003), Jansson and Tallant (2016).  
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theories that posit uncountably many mathematical objects, because we cannot assess the number of 
entities that PLP posits.  
 
Given that it contains all of the mathematical objects there are, and all of the abstracta there are, we 
seem to be able to know, for example, that mathematical space contains ZF set theory (since it 
contains every possible mathematical structure), and hence that it contains very large cardinals like 
Berkeley cardinals. It is a quick road from here to paradox if we attempt to determine how many 
things there are in mathematical space “altogether”. 
 
What matters for the proponent of PLP is that each structure posited is internally consistent. 
However, there cannot be a mathematical function that allows us to add all of the elements of each 
of those structures together and determine how many things there are in mathematical space. There 
cannot be an external-to-all-mathematical-structures “addition” function. There may be no fact of 
the matter about how many things there are in mathematical space. At the least, there is no 
accessible-to-and-statable-by-us fact, so we cannot assess PLP for quantitative parsimony.  
 
Part of this problem is one shared by all mathematical theories that posit uncountably many things, 
and so it may be unfair to claim that it is because of PLP’s third-order viciousness that we cannot 
assess it for quantitative parsimony. I think that PLP has additional problems here, though, because 
it must insist on quantifying over certain objects that other theories need not. But I don’t have the 
space to argue for this, and I suspect that quantitative parsimony is not the right kind of parsimony 
to focus on in the first place. So let’s consider qualitative parsimony.  
 
Sometimes qualitative parsimony is taken to be about distinguishing types from tokens; sometimes it 
is taken to be about distinguishing ontological categories from entities (e.g. a theory that posits both 
properties and individuals is less parsimonious than a theory that posits only properties). For PLP, 
where we draw the parsimony line does not matter (unless it is drawn only between abstract and 
concrete objects). While other mathematical theories that posit uncountably many objects can 
maintain that there is only one kind of mathematical object (or, at least, finitely many kinds), PLP 
must posit uncountably many kinds of mathematical entities.  
 
Let pointillism be the view that abstract objects are dimensionless, property-less points in abstract 
space, and that none is any different from any other (except in the relations they bear to one 
another). Let qualitativism be the view that abstracta have qualitative properties just like concreta do: 
the equilateral triangle is, itself, triangular, and hence distinct from the square, which is square. Let 
structuralism be the view that abstract objects are structures of relational properties. Focus for a 
moment on pointillism. A view that says that abstract objects are all dimensionless, property-less 
points in abstract space is as (qualitatively) parsimonious as possible while still positing the existence 
of something. It only posits objects of one kind.   
 
If PLP could be adapted to only (e.g.) include pointillist objects, then it would be parsimonious on 
both the type understanding and the ontological category understanding of parsimony. But it cannot 
be adapted this way, which contrasts with both (i) other platonist views that posit uncountable 
infinities and (ii) MU. PLP must be committed not just to every internally consistent mathematical 
structure but also to every internally consistent nature that each of those structures might have. So 
PLP is committed not to NN and NN*, but instead to NN(P), NN(P)*, NN(Q), NN(Q)*, and so 
on, where (P) and (Q) are labels for ‘pointillist’ and ‘qualitativist’. PLP cannot decide between 
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various metaphysical ways that abstracta might be; instead, the proponent of PLP must accept every 
possible metaphysical account of the natures of abstracta.  
 
It is easy to imagine views which don’t even treat abstracta as, fundamentally speaking, objects—e.g. 
“bundle theory” in the abstract realm, which gives a reductive story about the nature of abstract 
objects as being bundles of properties (which themselves are not reducible to abstract objects). PLP 
must accept those as well.  
 
The central point is that PLP is committed to all the entities that the pointillist, the qualitativist, and 
the structuralist posits, and all the entities that any consistent theory of abstracta posits. Unlike MU, 
and unlike other platonist theories, a central motivation for PLP is that it is supposed to resolve the 
epistemic challenge for platonism. And it is supposed to do this by guaranteeing that, for any 
abstract object we could possibly consistently conceive of (and more!), that abstract object exists. 
Without this aspect of PLP, it can no longer earn its keep, since we will be again be faced with (a the 
epistemic challenge (how do we avoid the magical coincidence problem if we believe in NN(S) and it 
turns out that is the only NN-like structure that exists?). The possible natures of abstracta seem 
endless, and not just endless, but uncountable. And regardless of whether we draw the line at types 
or ontological kinds, it is precisely metaphysical natures of entities that we appeal to in qualitative 
parsimony judgments.  
 
This does not entail that PLP is wildly qualitatively (ontologically) unparsimonious. Some candidate 
metaphysical natures of abstracta will be alien to us, and so we can’t possibly access the facts (if 
there are facts) about how many kinds of things PLP posits. We cannot enumerate what is alien to 
us. So we cannot assess PLP for qualitative parsimony. This problem—perhaps unlike the 
quantitative parsimony problem—is unique (among mathematical theories) to PLP, and is a product 
of PLP’s third-order vices: it is because PLP (i) cannot specify its primitives and (ii) cannot be fully 
scaffolded that it is not assessable for qualitative ontological parsimony.  
 
5.1 So much for ontological parsimony. What about ideological parsimony?  
 
A theory’s ideological parsimony is a measure of how theoretically rather than ontologically 
parsimonious it is: how simple the theory itself is (perhaps to be cashed out in terms of number of 
primitive expressions required in the vocabulary, length, etc.).15 At first glance, PLP is very 
ideologically parsimonious: it can be summed up in a sentence or two (e.g. something like “anything 
goes, so long as its existence does not lead to a contradiction”). But this is wrong. PLP cannot be 
assessed for so-called ‘ideological parsimony’, at least, it cannot be assessed in comparison to its 
rivals (which is what matters for us in making second-order virtue and vice judgments). 
 
PLP’s appears to be ideologically parsimonious because it is baseless, guideless, and not sufficiently 
scaffolded: it doesn’t have the features that it should given the question it is trying to answer, and it 
is because it lacks these features that it can be stated so simply. So we cannot compare it to theories 
that are foundational, guiding, and sufficiently scaffolded. In order to compare two theories for 
ideological parsimony, we have to normalize something about their form. That is, we have to require 
that they provide us with at least somewhat similar levels of information about various things. 
Roughly, we might think, they have to be equally informative recipes. Just as we shouldn’t compare 
                                                        
15 For discussions of ideological parsimony, see Cowling (2013), Dasgupta and Turner (2015), Finocchiaro (2019, 
forthcoming), McSweeney (2019), Sider (2011). 
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(e.g.) the number of primitives terms in a recipe for brownies that says “intuitively toss some 
ingredients together and throw it in the oven” and one with a list of every ingredient and detailed 
instructions, we shouldn’t compare two theories that differ in this way. And because PLP is 
essentially third-order vicious, we can’t flesh it out in order to compare it to third-order virtuous 
ontological theories. So it looks like we can’t compare PLP to other theories that are more third-
order virtuous. 
 
We might instead try to normalize things down to the level of information and detail that PLP 
provides us: perhaps, in order to make comparative ideological parsimony judgments, we simply 
need to take stripped-down versions of competitor theories. This won’t work, because most 
metaphysical theories that are third-order virtuous will cease to say anything at all if we attempt to 
strip them of their third-order virtues. Consider a toy version of (fleshed-out) MU which says that 
the simples are all homogenous (tokens of a single type); that the axioms of MU are true; and that 
every ordinary object (tables, trees, bicycles, etc.) is nothing over and above a composite of those 
simples. And now consider what would happen if we were to strip this toy theory of its third-order 
virtues and try to make it more like PLP. At best, we might end up with the statement ‘composition 
always occurs’, and nothing else.  
 
I conclude that we cannot assess PLP for ontological or ideological parsimony; and that this is 
because PLP is (essentially) third-order vicious. There is no epistemically accessible fact of the 
matter about either how many things, or how many kinds of things, PLP posits. Moreover, 
theoretical virtues seem to be comparative: we make judgments about which theory to accept, not 
about how second-order virtuous a theory is, full stop. PLP is not apt for comparison with respect 
to ontological theories that more thoroughly answer their questions..  
 
 
6. Some Methodological Notes 
 
I have laid out three claims about what it takes for an ontological theory to be third-order virtuous. I 
have examined two theories, mereological universalism (MU) and plenitudinous platonism (PLP). I 
have argued that the answer to whether MU is third-order virtuous is “it depends”—because MU is 
flexible in a way that allows us to make it third-order virtuous. In contrast, PLP is essentially third-
order vicious. I have also tried to begin to show that PLP’s third-order vices lead directly to 
difficulties with assessing it for second-order virtue. (Though I should note that more work would 
need to be done here to fully establish this claim.) I want to conclude by saying a bit more about the 
relationship between third-order virtue and vice and progress. 
 
There is an important relationship between an ontological theory being third-order vicious and it 
involving some kind of incurable ignorance. PLP is committed to incurable ignorance about what 
there is (alien abstracta) and what it is like (e.g. natures that abstracta might have that we can’t think 
of). And this is closely tied to its baselessness, guidelessness, and insufficient scaffolding. Being 
third-order vicious doesn’t lead to incurable ignorance. Instead, involving some incurable ignorance 
is just part of what it is for a theory to be essentially baseless, guideless, or not sufficiently 
scaffolded. So it looks like incurable ignorance might be a third-order vice itself.  
 
I think this is right. But I also want to be clear that I am not trying to claim that we should never 
favor theories that are third-order vicious. Just as we must sometimes settle for second-order vicious 
theories (when, for example, there simply isn’t an alternative that accounts for the data we have and 
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answers the question we are posing), we must sometimes settle for third-order vicious theories. 
When we do so, we are answering ontological questions by saying that they are not fully answerable 
by creatures like us.16 Similarly, that a theory is third-order vicious does not entail that it is false. It 
might be that we just can’t get a successful recipe for our ontology.   
 
I think that, insofar as metaphysical progress is possible, when ontological theories (like PLP) are 
essentially third-order vicious, we must remember that they may be true, but also should not work to 
develop them further. This has much broader implications. To give one example, I have long been 
attracted to neo-Kantian metaphysics, or at least, to readings of Kant on which he is committed to 
there being things-in-themselves, but that we can know very little about them. (We can know that 
they are not mind-dependent, and hence not spatiotemporal—note the similarity to the kinds of 
things that platonists say about abstract objects.)  
 
If Kant is putting forward an ontological theory, then the theory is clearly—perhaps 
paradigmatically—essentially third-order vicious. (This also makes clear that while plenitudinous 
theories are often third-order vicious, so are theories that have almost nothing in common with 
PLP—so if you were worried about whether my view is designed to cause problems for 
plenitudinous views, it isn’t! We also cannot assess the Kantian view of things-in-themselves for 
second-order virtues…)  
 
If they want to accept my account, here are two ways for (neo)Kantians to go here: either deny that 
the theory being put forward is an answer to an ontological question (and hence claim that it is not 
an ontological theory), or accept that it is but claim that (e.g) we can’t do better, and should stop 
looking for a third-order virtuous ontological theory.  
 
I’ll quickly say something about these two options, while staying neutral with respect to Kant 
interpretation. I suspect that many contemporary metaphysicians take the Kantian view to be 
answering an ontological question, and thus find the limitations of the view frustrating. If the view is 
an ontological theory, then it is an essentially third-order vicious one, and what I have said here 
suggests that this frustration is justified:, we shouldn’t—qua metaphysicians—be either endorsing it 
or attempting to flesh it out. Instead, we should be looking for alternative ontological theories, 
developing those that are not essentially third-order vicious, and often reflecting on whether they do 
better than (e.g.) the Kantian metaphysical view. Kantian humility about things-in-themselves must 
be held as a background possibility about what is true, but our focus, as metaphysicians, ought to be 
elsewhere. I think this is an interesting result, one that may lend support to the combination of 
metametaphysical angst and engagement with first-order metaphysics that seems common amongst 
contemporary metaphysicians.  
 
If, on the other hand, Kant’s claims about things-in-themselves are not meant to constitute an 
ontological theory, then what are they meant to do? A plausible answer is that his views here can’t 
be disentangled from his answers to epistemic and moral questions.17 Contemporary metaphysicians 
(including me, here!) often try to separate out epistemic, moral, and metaphysical questions, and we 
                                                        
16 For recent discussion of this sort of epistemic indeterminacy see Bennett (2009) and Willard (2013). 
17 E.g. see Kant (1781/1787, B xxx). There is lots of contemporary analytic movement back to the inseparability claim 
(which non-analytic philosophers perhaps never lost sight of!). Among metaphysicians this is perhaps most prominent in 
ameliorist philosophers like Haslanger (e.g. 2012); in social and feminist metaphysics more generally; and in Chan’s 
account of “ethics first” metaphysics (ms).  
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might resist this by claiming that there is no way to ask ontological questions separately from the 
epistemic and moral questions they are tangled up with. If this is right, it is the project of trying to 
isolate ontological theories—as answers to ontological questions—that is problematic, and not third-
order vicious ontological theories themselves. So we might worry that the project I’ve undertaken in 
this paper—attempting to elaborate what it is for an ontological theory to be third-order virtuous—
is misguided. 
 
I hope not, since my interest in theories like PLP lies precisely in their systematicity: they attempt to 
simultaneously answer ontological and epistemic (and sometimes metaethical!) questions—a feature 
that they share with much of historical metaphysics. I don’t think that we can separate metaphysics 
from epistemology, or from morality. Perhaps, though, once we elaborate and develop our theories, 
we might be able to separate metaphysical questions from epistemic and moral ones, and assess our 
theories as answers to each. This paper does a small piece of that work, by setting up a framework 
for assessing theories as answers to ontological questions. But it deserves a cautionary note, which is 
that we risk losing sight of virtues of theories as answers to epistemic, moral, and metaethical 
questions when we assess them as answers to ontological questions.  
 
I want to end by considering Einstein’s distinction between constructive and principle theories, and 
his philosophical stance towards them.  
 
Most (physical theories) are constructive. They attempt to build up a picture of the more 
complex phenomena out of the materials of a relatively simple formal scheme from which 
they start out. Thus the kinetic theory of gases seeks to reduce mechanical, thermal, and 
diffusional processes to movements of molecules -- i.e., to build them up out of the 
hypothesis of molecular motion. When we say that we have succeeded in understanding a 
group of natural processes, we invariably mean that a constructive theory has been found 
which covers the processes in question. 
  
Along with this most important class of theories there exists… "principle-theories." These 
employ the analytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements which form their basis and 
starting-point are not hypothetically constructed but empirically discovered ones, general 
characteristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to mathematically formulated 
criteria which the separate processes or the theoretical representations of them have to 
satisfy. Thus the science of thermodynamics seeks by analytical means to deduce necessary 
conditions, which separate events have to satisfy, from the universally experienced fact that 
perpetual motion is impossible.  
  
The advantages of the constructive theory are completeness, adaptability, and clearness, 
those of the principle theory are logical perfection and security of the foundations. The 
theory of relativity belongs to the latter class. (1919, 101.) 
 
 
Einstein thought that our goals should be to get constructive theories, and that only they give us real 
understanding. Constructive theories give us models of reality,  and then “build up” the higher-level 
phenomena out of that foundation. Being constructive is quite close to being foundational and 
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guiding! Constructive theories tell us something foundational about reality, and then show us how to 
recover the phenomena.18  
 
But Einstein also thought that principle theories were undervalued; and principle theories are 
somewhat close to certain kinds of third-order vicious ontological theories, like PLP and Lewis’ 
modal realism: both involve general principles that serve as constraints, and that we can draw out 
the logical consequences of. (These theories don’t involve empirical generalizations, though!) One 
reason he thought principle theories were undervalued is that they lead to important results—like 
special relativity, which in its initial form was a principle theory that reconciled two seemingly 
logically inconsistent empirical generalizations.  This is less relevant here. But his second reason was 
that they provide important constraints on allowable constructive theories.   
 
I don’t endorse Einstein’s philosophical views more generally, and I flag that analogizing my views 
to his is messy. But all of the upshots of translating his views back into my framework are worth 
taking seriously. First, third-order vicious theories can be informative. Second, third-order vicious 
theories don’t successfully answer their ontological questions, but they might guide us (if we assume 
they are true) by narrowing the possible third-order virtuous theories. This is particularly so if third-
order vicious theories are constraining, as PLP is. Notice, though, that the constraints that PLP 
places on abstract reality are so minimal that they cannot give us much information; and that 
essentially third-order vicious theories can’t narrow the possibility space of third-order virtuous 
theories. So some third-order vicious theories neither give us much information themselves nor 
constrain the possibilities for third-order virtuous theories. 
 
Third, insofar as genuine understanding is an aim of metaphysical inquiry, we ultimately want our 
theories to be third-order virtuous. Theories that essentially rule out understanding parts of reality 
(like abstract space or modal space) are inconsistent with understanding reality more generally, 
which is an important aim of metaphysical inquiry. Perhaps it will turn out that we can’t jointly 
satisfy this aim of metaphysical inquiry and another important aim: truth. But we should try. 
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